4. Inside ownership: An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of the Issuer's shares by its directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the ownership of the Issuer's shares by each of its directors and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus, equals one half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer's shares owned by its directors and key officers must be disclosed in the prospectus, and equals zero when the ownership of the Issuer's shares by its directors and key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.
5. Irregular contracts: An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer's contracts outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the prospectus, equals one half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of business must be disclosed, and equals zero otherwise.
6. Transactions: An index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., "related parties"). Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be disclosed in the prospectus, equals one half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties must be disclosed in the prospectus, and equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need not be disclosed in the prospectus.
The liability standard index is the arithmetic average of three variables:
1. Liability standard for the Issuer and its directors: Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Issuer and its directors in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. We first code separately the liability standard applicable to the Issuer and its directors and then average the two of them. The liability standard applicable to the Issuer's directors equals one when investors are only required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement. Equals one third when investors must also prove that the director acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from directors is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence. The liability standard applicable to the Issuer is coded analogously.
2. Liability standard for distributors: Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the distributor in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement. Equals one third when investors must also prove that the distributor acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from the distributor is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence.
3. Liability standard for accountants: Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the accountant in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to prove that the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two thirds when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading accounting information. Equals one third when investors must also prove that the accountant acted with negligence. Equals zero if restitution from the accountant is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence. Table 2 provides results from cross-country regressions of stock market capitalization to GDP ratio on openness and the export status of the countries, using an alternative specification considered by Rajan and Zingales (2003) . In this specification, the main explicative variable is the interaction of country's average openness over the period 1980-2009 with the log of the average GDP per capita over the same period. The regressions show a statistically significant differential effect of the net exporter variable, which is in line with the implications of the theoretical model.
Financial Development and Openness

Computation of Economic Equilibria
The main steps of the algorithm for computing the political equilibrium follow the methodology of Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) and are described in the Appendix of the paper. This section provides a more detailed description of the computation of economic equilibria for a given policy function Ψ and the computation of economic equilibria with one-period deviation from Ψ. Obtaining solutions to these problems is necessary for evaluating agents' indirect utilities under alternative policies in Step 2 of the main algorithm described in the Appendix of the paper.
Economic Equilibrium under a Given Policy Function
The characterization of the economic equilibrium can be rewritten as a system of functional equations in which the endogenous variables (q t , K t+1 , z t , w t , R t ) are functions of the aggregate state (θ, K) and the policy function Ψ that specifies the level of investor protection for each aggregate state. Since the capital supply curve directly depends on the current level of investor protection, the functions characterizing z t and K t+1 will directly depend on Ψ. The price functions, on the other hand, depend on Ψ only indirectly and will be functions of the aggregate state (θ, K) only. 1 For expositional reasons, I consider in this section only the case of an economy without trade in goods. The case with trade is analogous except that we need to keep track separately of the capital owned by domestic residents K s and the capital used by the firms in the consumption goods sector K d , with the government balanced budget condition pinning down the relationship between these two variables. Adopting the convention that primes indicate the next period variables, the functional equations characterizing the economic equilibrium are:
1. The arbitrage condition for investors
2. the first-order conditions for maximization of profit in the consumption goods sector
3. the indifference condition characterizing the skill type of the infra-marginal entrepreneur
4. the law of motion of the aggregate stock of capital
5. the condition that the current investor protection policy γ is consistent with the policy function Ψ:
To compute an economic equilibrium under Ψ, I need to find a fixed point of the system of equations (1)- (6). In practice, I approximate the solution by solving the fixed point problem on a discretized grid of state variables and using the shape-preserving cubic spline interpolation to evaluate the function q on the points outside the grid. The algorithm for computing the economic equilibrium consists of the following steps:
1. Discretize the state space into a two-dimensional grid of (θ, K).
2. Guess function q (θ, K) on the discretized grid. For each (θ, K) on the grid: (c) Compute the price function
where q (θ , K ) is the shape-preserving cubic spline interpolant of q evaluated at (θ , K ).
6. If the policy function prescribes perfect investor protection γ = 0:
, where
is the unique equilibrium price under perfect investor protection.
(c) compute the least wealthy entrepreneur as z (θ,
7. Check ifq (θ, K) is sufficiently close to q (θ, K) at all (θ, K) on the grid. If yes, a solution has been found. If not, update the guess for q (θ, K) and iterate on steps 2-7 until convergence.
Economic Equilibria with One-Period Deviation from Ψ
These are equilibria that agents need to think about in order to evaluate alternative policies. Here, the current policy is given byγ = Ψ (θ, K), and all future policies take values generated by Ψ (θ, K). The new current policy implies that the current price of capital must be evaluated by a new price functionq (θ, K), whereas all future prices are evaluated through q (θ, K), which applies under Ψ. The algorithm to compute these equilibria follows:
1. Discretize state space into a two-dimensional grid of (θ, K).
2. Guess functionq (θ, K) on the discretized grid. For each (θ, K) on the grid: where q (θ ,K ) is the shape-preserving cubic spline interpolant of q, the equilibrium price function under Ψ obtained previously, evaluated at (θ ,K ). Notice that it is important to use the equilibrium q under Ψ and notq to evaluate future prices.
6. If the deviation policy prescribes perfect investor protection,γ = 0:
(a) Set the price functionq (θ, K) =
A(1+r) κ
(b) ComputeK as the solution tỗ q (θ, K) = 1 1 + r E θ θ F 1 K , 1 + (1 − δ) q θ ,K , where q (θ ,K ) is the shape-preserving cubic spline interpolant of q, the equilibrium price function under Ψ obtained previously, evaluated at (θ ,K ). Notice that it is important to use the equilibrium q under Ψ and notq to evaluate future prices.
(c) compute the least wealthy entrepreneur asz (θ, K; Ψ) = G −1 1 −K
7. Check ifq (θ, K) is sufficiently close toq (θ, K) at all (θ, K) on the grid. If yes, a solution has been found. If not, update the guess forq (θ, K) and iterate on steps 2-7 until convergence.
